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ABSTRACT
The adoption and enforcement of building codes is considered the
most effective tool in safeguarding lives and property against
earthquakes. There would appear to be a vital regulatory role for
government in the enforcement of building codes, but this is
somewhat at odds with the neoliberal agenda of ‘rolling back the
state’. This paper explores constraints to the implementation of
building codes in the context of changing roles and
responsibilities of local authorities in Bihar in India. In-depth
interviews were conducted with key stakeholders across major
urban centres in north Bihar. Some factors, such as: code
complexity; competition between the public and private sectors
for qualified personnel; and low public risk perception were found
to be less significant in Bihar than has been noted elsewhere,
while other factors such as: the cost of earthquake-resistant
measures; political interests; corrupt practices; and lack of
government capacity were important. Additional factors were also
revealed by the research, some of which are exacerbated by the
neoliberal climate of urban governance. While the recent 2014
byelaws represent an improvement in the system and a degree of
re-regulation, ambiguities create opportunities for failures arising
from ‘normalised irresponsibility’.
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1. Introduction
Poor compliance with building codes, combined with inadequate construction practices
and low levels of preparedness, has exacerbated people’s vulnerability to earthquakes
to a considerable level (Ainuddin, Mukhtar, & Ainuddin, 2014). The adoption and enforce-
ment of building codes is widely considered the most effective tool in safeguarding lives
and property against major disasters such as earthquakes and the most important factor in
reducing a community’s risk (Ainuddin et al., 2014; UNESCO, 2009). Spence (2004) notes
that where building codes have been well accepted and thoroughly implemented, they
have been highly successful in limiting damage from extreme events. Given the impor-
tance of building code enforcement there would appear to be a vital regulatory role for
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government, but this is somewhat at odds with the neoliberal agenda of ‘rolling back the
state’. This is clearly pointed to by Krimgold (2011):
[O]ver the past approximately 30 years, international development has been powerfully influ-
enced by emphasis on free market economic philosophy including privatization and deregu-
lation. In this climate, very little attention has been focused on formal regulation of urban
development, building standards or land-use management. During a period of rapid urbaniz-
ation over the past 30–40 years, disaster risk has expanded dramatically due to unregulated
growth of the built environment. (Krimgold, 2011, p. 55)
This paper explores the challenges that arise in the enforcement of building codes in Bihar
in India by reviewing the signiﬁcance of factors that have been cited in the literature as
constraints to building code implementation. This is contextualised by giving attention
to the changes and debates in urban governance which have an important bearing on
the regulatory environment in which building code enforcement takes place.
1.1. Barriers to the effective implementation of building codes
Great strides have been made in building standards over the last 30 years and national and
international building standards have been consistently revised and improved following
major earthquake events as building safety often takes a higher profile (Krimgold, 2011;
Mora, Chang, Beatson, & Morahan, 2015). However, in poorer or less well-governed con-
texts, it is the enforcement of building codes that tends to be considered the major chal-
lenge. Spence (2004), for example, argues that the widespread destruction of buildings in
the earthquakes of Kocaeli, Turkey, in 1999 and Gujarat, India, in 2001 was not due to
inadequate codes. Destruction occurred because codes were not generally adopted. He
later notes that in any relatively poor country seeking to industrialise rapidly in a competi-
tive global economy, legislated inspection and building control will always face difficulties.
While efforts to strengthen building code enforcement are being made in many places
(e.g. Dixit, Yatabe, Dahal, & Bhandary, 2013 for Nepal), to date, empirical research on regu-
latory regimes for the implementation of building codes and factors influencing the
success of building code implementation has focused on wealthier countries (e.g. van
der Heijden & Meijer, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; May, 2003, 2007; May & Wood, 2003).
Chmutina and Bosher (2015) explore the factors influencing building code implemen-
tation in Barbados tentatively conclude, on the basis of 15 interviews, that include: lack
of capacity, human resources and coordination at the national level and a lack of under-
standing among the general public that the compliance with the code would significantly
improve the safety of the dwellings. Bilham (2013) suggests that broader societal factors
are at play in his assertion that in developing nations three factors – poverty, corruption
and ignorance – conspire to reduce the effective application of seismic resistant codes.
Below these and other factors cited in the literature are explored in more depth.
1.1.1. Code complexity
Building codes may be ‘too complex’ due to multiple iterations and improvements (van der
Heijden & Meijer, 2007) and replication from a developed world to a developing world
context with lower technical capacities (Spence, 2004). This may compromise implemen-
tation and enforcement (Spence, 2004). More sophisticated codes might help make
future construction safer but simpler rules are more likely to be adhered (Spence, 2004).
2 S. JONES AND V. VASVANI
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1.1.2. Expertise, capacity and sector competition
Inadequate expertise is often cited as a constraint to the proper enforcement of building
regulations (van der Heijden 2010a, van der Heijden & Meijer, 2007). Krimgold (2011, p. 56)
notes that ‘there is a shortage of trained professionals in the building professions. In many
disaster-prone developing countries, there are no adequate instructional programmes for
engineers and architects or builders on seismic-, wind- or flood-resistant design’. A particu-
lar issue for seismic resilience is the ‘invisible’ difference between safe and unsafe
reinforced concrete construction (Krimgold, 2011). The building regulatory process
requires competent professionals to review plans and inspect sites and in most developing
countries, state bodies are under-resourced and underfunded and technical resources in
terms of trained personnel are limited (for India, see Williams &Mawdseley, 2006 regarding
environmental agencies/regulation; Kathuria, 2007 for pollution; and Chandel, Sharma, &
Marwaha, 2016 for energy efficiency in buildings). The private sector, in such cases, is
more likely to be able to compete in terms of paying good salaries to competent pro-
fessionals. Typically, local government salaries are not adequate to attract or hold qualified
personnel, particularly in rural areas (Bilham, 2009; Krimgold, 2011).
1.1.3. Accountability
Corruption is often cited as a particular problem for safe construction (e.g. Bilham, 2013).
Building owners and developers may find it less expensive to bribe a regulatory official
than to conform to relevant building standards (Krimgold, 2011). Corruption can lead to
illegal permits and unauthorised inspection certificates being issued. A lack of culpability
and punishment for law breaking compounds the problem. A particular form of corruption
may prevail because of the relationship between the building industry and local poli-
ticians. As noted by Krimgold (2011), local government is often dominated by building
owners and developers who are not predisposed to limiting the prerogative of investors
and builders, which may weaken the capacity for regulatory enforcement. For example in
India, Abdulraheem (2009) explains that ‘[M]any state funded construction activities …
such as road-building are dominated by the construction mafia, which are groupings of
corrupt public work officials, materials suppliers, politicians and construction contractors’.
Also in India, Weinstein (2008) illustrates, through a detailed case study of Mumbai, how
powerful organisations (organised crime gangs) with deep connections to political
parties were able to overcome regulatory barriers in the construction industry, where,
he suggests limited opportunities exist to develop property through purely legal means.
Furthermore, the political will to combat this behaviour is often lacking. As Bilham
(2009) notes, the term of most democratically elected officials rarely exceeds 1% of the
return time of most plate boundary earthquakes. As a result few politicians are motivated
to push the enforcement of earthquake-resistant codes ahead of other pressing issues for
which they may be responsible.
1.1.4. Demand
Spence (2004, p. 391) notes that ‘the success of any government action depends equally
on the development in society of a “safety culture” in which citizens both understand the
risks they face and are prepared to participate in the management of them’. A public that is
well-informed regarding the level of risk is more likely to support and abide by seismic
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codes and be willing to pay higher prices for safer construction. According to Krimgold
(2011) the cost of safe construction is estimated to be between 5% and 10% of construc-
tion cost and the regulatory process itself can add around 1% of construction costs.
However, these relatively small increments are readily balanced by the reduction of
future disaster loss of life and property, and the benefit–cost ratio is high (Krimgold,
2011; Spence, 2004).
1.2. Regulatory capitalism: the role of the state in building code enforcement
Krimgold (2011) argues that assurance of safe construction requires a functioning regulat-
ory process. Most writers on disaster mitigation suggest that there is a need for govern-
ment action in terms of legislation and enforcement (Spence, 2004), but more market-
oriented systems have also evolved. This section briefly situates the regulatory practice
of building code enforcement within the wider context of the changing ‘role of govern-
ment’ in urban governance.
In the post-war period, as part of the ideology of the Keynesian welfare state (in devel-
oped countries in particular), there had been a vast expansion of state intervention in the
regulation of urban development and redevelopment, including building codes and other
planning regulations (Sorensen, 2011) referred to as the ‘command and control approach’.
While the command and control approach tended to have clear-cut lines of responsibility
and thus accountability (May, 2007), its alleged weakness includes the prescriptive rules
that impose needless costs; and generate adversarial relations between regulators and
limit innovation (Levi-Faur, 2011; May, 2003). As the Keynesian idea of state-run subsidised
services came into question in the late 1970s, it was replaced by ‘neoliberalism’ which can
be understood as an ideology that glorifies market-based mechanisms rather than state
intervention and as such entails minimising regulations (Furlong, 2012; Horowitz, 2015).
However, according to Levi-Faur and Jordana (2005), while conventional wisdom holds
that we live in a neoliberal era, the current order is anything but free of regulation. While at
the ideological level neoliberalism preaches and promotes deregulation, at the practical
level, paradoxically, it has tended to extend regulation (Levi-Faur, 2005; Levi-Faur &
Jordana, 2005). Peck and Tickell (2002) frame a similar observation in terms of two distinct
phases of neoliberalism: the first phase of ‘roll-back’ and the second phase of ‘roll-out’ neo-
liberalism. Roll-back neoliberalism involved deregulation at higher scales of government
and a reduction of service delivery at the local scale (Furlong, 2012). Largely in response
to the failures and crises resulting from the policies of deregulation and marketisation
of roll-back neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 390), roll-out neoliberalism focused on
the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalised modes of governance
and regulatory relations (re-regulation) to consolidate state power and establish the
rules for market-led management (Furlong, 2012; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Sangameswaran,
2009).1 Levi-Faur (2005) suggests that this new global order may well be most aptly charac-
terised as ‘regulatory capitalism’. Under regulatory capitalism, the state retains responsibil-
ity for steering, while business increasingly takes over the functions of service provision
and technological innovation (Levi-Faur, 2005 citing Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Responsi-
bilities of the state are delegated to third-party regulatory agencies, new regulatory instru-
ments emerge and the capacity for self-regulation by individuals and corporations is
harnessed (Levi-Faur, 2005), generating an individualisation of responsibility that places
4 S. JONES AND V. VASVANI
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more blame on civil-society actors in the case of failure (Sletto & Nygren, 2016 citing
Lemke, 2001, p. 202).
Under the new order of regulatory capitalism, Levi-Faur and Jordana (2005) argue that it
is important to make sense of the impacts of this multifaceted transformation of public
policies. It has resulted in a diversity of regulatory arrangements and the results are
often contradictory and unintended (Freestone, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2005) and involve ‘trial-
and-error’ (Freestone, 2011, p. 177), as neoliberal projects collide with inherited regulatory
landscapes (Sorensen, 2011). So, while neoliberalism ‘remains an ideological force and
shaper of governance frameworks of irresistible momentum’, it is important to acknowl-
edge that it gives rise to diverse and hybrid local forms (Horowitz, 2015; Sletto &
Nygren, 2016).
The regulation of buildings standards is one clear arena in which there has been an
increase in private sector involvement since the 1990s (van der Heijden, 2009) in many
developed countries such as Australia and Canada (van der Heijden, 2010a, 2010b,
2010c), Holland (van der Heijden & Meijer, 2007) and Japan (Sorensen, 2011). These con-
texts indeed reveal diverse and hybrid forms of regulatory arrangements. Attempts have
been made to categorise these new regimes. May (2003, 2007), for example, refers to the
traditional ‘command and control’ regime as ‘prescriptive regulation’ and identifies two
alternative forms of regulation as ‘system-based regulation’ (where processes are the
focus of monitoring) and ‘performance-based systems’ (where results or outcomes are
the focus of monitoring and the means of achieving them are not prescribed). He
found that the substitution of professional accountability under system- and perform-
ance-regimes, for bureaucratic accountability under the command and control approach
led to a relaxation of controls. In New Zealand specifically, he found that there was a blur-
ring of responsibility between the public and private sectors and inadequately trained cer-
tifiers in the new regime. van der Heijden (2010a) also categorises the spectrum of
regulatory reforms, but in terms of the division of responsibilities between private and
state institutions. He also suggests that the reforms have led to ‘accountability shortfalls’.
He compared four regimes in two countries (Canada and Australia) and found that while
the private sector could provide a cheaper or faster process, it may become subject to con-
flicts of interest giving rise to a situation in which the regulators serve commercial interests
rather than society at large. He concluded that such privatised or third-party systems
required strong regulatory oversight to both monitor and discipline, as well as to consider
the content of permits and on-site controls, not just processes (van der Heijden 2010b).
Also for Japan, Sorensen (2011) notes that allowing private firms to examine and
approve applications for building permits increased the possibility of corruption and
increased local conflicts over development. As Bilham and Gaur (2013) keenly point out,
where seismic risk is high such failings could be assumed to result in higher death tolls
in the event of an earthquake.
In the field of risk, disaster or emergency management then, neoliberal policies have
particular implications. As Raikes and McBean (2016) explain, privatising aspects of emer-
gency management that have shown to be related to inefficient government adminis-
tration enables government to avoid legal responsibility. The privatisation of
responsibility and re-regulation in support of market mechanisms has the potential to gen-
erate what Prudham (2004; cited by O’Reilly & Dhanju, 2012) refers to as ‘normal accidents
of neoliberalism’, whereby risks are produced systemically in what he calls ‘organised’ (and
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to which could be added ‘normalised’) ‘irresponsibility’. Having considered, at least in
theoretical terms, the possibility that shifts towards neoliberal governance may produce
risk, we turn now to the specific context of India’s disaster risk and governance to set
the scene for the empirical research that forms the foundation of the paper.
2. Bihar: building codes, governance and seismic risk
Bilham (2009, 2013) notes that the global building boom of the last four decades has
resulted in an increase in building stock without consideration to earthquake resistance
and, in developing nations, inferior materials and incorrect assembly methods have been
adopted. van der Heijden (2016) explains that India faces unprecedented urbanisation
while simultaneously aligning with a ‘new urban governance’ that is characterised by a
shift away from government as the sole authority in governing urban issues and an increase
in self-organisation andmarket solutions as substitutes for or complements to the traditional
command and control style of regulation. However, this new approach to urban governance
is being introduced in a climate of weak and poorly organised government agencies respon-
sible for urban affairs; poor law enforcement and corruption in the construction and prop-
erty sectors and a culture of non-compliance with building codes (van der Heijden, 2016).
Bihar is one of the poorest states in India and for decades was considered a lawless state
rife with caste violence and corruption (Mathew & Moore, 2011). In the 1980s Bihar experi-
enced: irregular elections; the suppression of local democracy by the state; inadequate
finances; and insufficient staff and self-seeking leadership (Mitra, 2001, citing Khanna,
1994). While the situation has improved considerably since Nitish Kumar came into power
in 2005 (Singh & Stern, 2014), it remains an interesting case study with which to explore
how the problems of new urban governance in the global North may be amplified when
adopted where weak institutional capital exists (cf. van der Heijden, 2016).
Bihar is also an appropriate case study for seismic building code enforcement due to its
high seismic risk. The largest of India’s earthquakes occur on the northern boundary of the
Indian plate and according to Bilham (2004) and Bilham and Ambraseys (2005) with a con-
vergence rate of 1.8 m/century earthquakes at this plate boundary have apparently
released less than a third of their geodetic convergence, suggesting that either four
great (M > 8) earthquakes are missing from the historical record or they will occur in the
next few hundred years. Bihar is located in the high seismic zone that falls on the boundary
of the tectonic plate joining the Himalayan tectonic plate near the Bihar–Nepal border and
has six sub-surface fault lines moving towards the Gangetic planes in four directions
(BSDMA, 2016). As such it ‘is vulnerable to the worst kind of disaster caused by earthquake
of near maximum intensity’ (NDMA, 2016). Of the 38 districts of Bihar, 8 districts (in the
northernmost part of the state) fall in the highest risk area which is seismic zone V; 24 dis-
tricts fall in seismic zone IV; and 6 districts in seismic zone III (BSDMA, 2016). In all 15.2% of
the total area of Bihar is in Zone V (NDMA, 2016). A map of the seismic zones can be found
on the BSDMA’s website (www.ndma.gov.in/en/bihar-sdma-office).
Bihar has suffered 10 earthquakes in a span of 247 years ranging from 5.5 to 8.3 on the
Richter scale (NDMA, 2016). The worst of these recorded was the 1934 which resulted in
heavy fatalities (10,000 according to the BSDMA and 25,000 according to the NDMA web-
sites). Munger was ‘completely ruined’ while a large part of Patna ‘and Motihari, Muzaffar-
pur and Darbhanga in Bihar were also destroyed along with innumerable villages in
6 S. JONES AND V. VASVANI
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between’ (NDMA, 2016). The BSDMA website mentions the 1988 earthquake in eastern
Nepal but notes no damage. The 2011 Sikkim earthquake caused extensive damage to
buildings and infrastructure in Northeast India and 10 deaths in Bihar (NDMA, 2016).
The 2015 Nepal-Gorkha earthquake led to a total of 60 fatalities in Bihar and hundreds
of injuries (BSDMA, 2015).2
The Bihar State Disaster Management Authority (BSDMA) has the remit for promoting
capacity-building, long-term mitigation and awareness raising and training for disaster risk
reduction (e.g. architects, engineers, builders and masons in earthquake-resistant con-
struction). The BSDMA has several esteemed engineers who in 2012 adapted the National
Building Code of India (NBCI), which has been mandatory in all areas of highest seismic risk
since the Bhuj earthquake in 2001, into user friendly guides called Earthquake Safety
Guidelines for Bihar State. In 2013, they were released by the Chief Secretary of Bihar as
a Government Circular (i.e. they became legally binding) and they were also included as
an annex in the Bihar Building Byelaws (2014). The Urban Development and Housing
Department has responsibility for urban development policies, finances and planning
and developing the building bye laws (UDHD, 2014) while the municipalities are tasked
with public health, public safety and public works and executing the byelaws.
2.1. The Bihar Building Byelaws 2014
The building byelaws detail the requirements and responsibilities for building construction
in Bihar. They address not only structural safety but also stipulate parking, fire safety and
environmental provisions. There have not been any changes in the building code since
2005, but the 2014 byelaws are more stringent in terms of setbacks and plot-to-building
ratios. The focus below is upon structural safety.
Before 2009, municipal commissioners were solely responsible for approving building
applications. This was replaced in 2009 by a system in which empanelled architects
approved plans/applications3 and there were no requirements for supervision of building
projects. In 2014, under the new byelaws empanelled persons are also required to super-
vise certain building projects and the authorities were brought back into the process to
sign off approved plans. The account below, taken from the ‘Bihar Building Byelaws’
(2014) provides a little more detail.
The building byelaws are ‘enforceable’ in all municipal areas (including Municipal Cor-
porations, Municipal Councils, Nagar (town) Panchayats and Gram (village) Panchayats
falling within Planning Areas). This means that they apply, but are not enforceable in
Gram Panchayats that are not covered by a Planning Area (which applies to much of
rural Bihar). Approximately 89% of Bihar’s total population of about 100 million reside in
rural areas (Census, 2011; UNDP, 2011).
Applications for building permits should include a ‘sectional drawing’ but there is no
requirement for any features of earthquake-resistant construction to be identified.
However, the application should include a ‘certificate from a registered engineer that the
building plan and the design complies with earthquake safety requirements as stipulated
in the (government circular)’ and for buildings above G + 2 (three storey) to a maximum
of 10 m, the registered engineer should also sign a form to say that they have supervised
the construction to ensure compliance. Buildings above 15 m also require a structural stab-
ility certificate signed by the engineer/structural engineer and the owner. It is noted that the
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approval of the plan (by the Authority) shall not mean (validation of) structural stability,
workmanship or soundness of materials used in the construction and the approval shall
not bind or render the Authority liable in any way. Thus, although the municipal bodies
sign off the plans, they carry no responsibility for structural safety – this rests with the
owner and empanelled persons approving the plans and supervising the construction.
If work is not carried out according to plans, municipal bodies may issue a notice to halt
further construction. At this point the authorities have fulfilled their duties and any appeals
made become a judicial matter. The implications of these points are returned to in the
discussion.
3. Methodology
A total of 36 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted ranging from relatively
short interviews of 15–20 minutes which were a result of impromptu visits to over an hour
and a half (with pre-scheduled interviews held in offices). The aim was to interview all rel-
evant stakeholders. These included Municipal Commissioners/Executive Officers (2);
private homeowners and small scale builders (4); large-scale apartment block builders
(2); on-site contractors for government buildings (2); administrative/clerks processing
building applications (1); empanelled engineers (5); empanelled architects (3); government
engineers (9 in total but in two cases as a focus group discussion with 3 government staff);
government surveyor (1); cement and rebar vendor (1); civil engineer overseeing the con-
struction of a large apartment block (1); estate agent (1); government engineers (policy-
makers) involved in the drafting of the byelaws (2); a representative engineer from the
Department of Urban Development (1) and a representative of the Builders Association
(1).4 Interviews were recorded where interviewees willingly agreed, and transcribed. Anon-
ymity was guaranteed (hence no locations are specified relating to comments made by
stakeholders interviewed, only their position is disclosed in the discussion). Interviews
were conducted in municipal areas in seismic zones 4 and 5, within three municipal cor-
porations, two municipal councils and one nagar panchayat in central and north Bihar (see
Table 1 highlighting the key characteristics of the case study locations). The 36 interviews
were conducted in March and April 2016 but the research also draws upon some earlier
research on disaster risk reduction.5
4. Results and discussion: factors affecting building byelaw
implementation
This section first reflects on the significance of factors that emerged in the literature review
above, mirroring the same structure. It then considers factors which are less noted in the
literature but were found to be of significance on Bihar.
4.1. Code complexity
As noted earlier, the 2012 user-friendly Earthquake Safety Guidelines developed by the
BSDMA and based on the NBCI are annexed in the Building Byelaws. They contain diagrams
and are written in Hindi. As all government and empanelled engineers were familiar with and
had access to the byelaws they would also be aware of these guidelines. When asked what
8 S. JONES AND V. VASVANI
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Table 1. Background information on the case study areas.
Place
Distance and
direction from
Patna
Seismic
zone Admin. unit
Population
2011
Pop. growth
p.a. average
(1991–2011)
Engineers
employed
Empanelled
personsa
Number of
building
applic.
Number of
building
applic. passed Description/ notable characteristics
Munger 177 km E IV Municipal
corporation
213,303 2.2% 2JE, 1AE, T,
R, 1S
15 156 156 Least vibrant and developing urban area, few
consumer goods, run down colonial buildings,
heavy police presence, weak transport links
Jamalpur 180 km E IV Municipal
Council
105,430 1.1% – 6 350 350 15 km from Munger with a rail link (not present in
Munger)
Dharbanga 131 km NE V Municipal
Corporation
296,039 1.77% 3JE, 1AE,
1ME
50 131 – Vibrant growing city, high levels of construction
outside the periphery of the MC. Height restricted
to 5 m due to the proximity of a military airport –
above this permission is needed from the airport
authority
Muzzaffarpur 73 km N IV Municipal
Corporation
354,462 2.3% 2JE, 2AE 101 606 426 Vibrant and growing city with good access to
Patna
Danupur 11 km W IV Municipal
Council
182,429 5.2% 1AE, 1JE, 1S 220 111 29 Extremely high rate of urbanisation as Patna’s
growth is constrained by the Ganges – this
corridor has good road and rail links. Many
multistorey apartments for the growing middle
class of Bihar – often rented out as investments;
over eight storeys
Naubatpur 22 km SW IV Nagar
Panchayat
25,011 0 Yes R 22 22 Most of the agricultural land has been purchased
by speculative builders; still predominantly rural
but with some RRC 3 and four storey buildings;
relatively poor area with mostly mud and brick
single storey dwellings
Notes: T, temporary; R, retired; JE, junior engineer; AE, assistant engineer; ME, municipal engineer; S, surveyor.
aThese included architects, civil engineers, structural engineers and diploma holder engineers.
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could be done to increase earthquake-resistant construction in Bihar, not a single interviewee
suggested that the building codes were too complex, needed simplifying or were incongru-
ent with local conditions, suggesting code complexity is not an issue in Bihar.
4.2. Expertise, capacity and sector competition
The numbers of government engineers employed to review building applications is woe-
fully inadequate. It was estimated by staff in some of the corporations and councils that
four or five times the number of staff would be needed to engage in the process properly.
While most municipal staff suggested that they were able to check sites at the application
stage, few of the sites had been revisited. None of the municipal bodies had as yet issued
completion certificates.6 One empanelled architect suggested that ‘Earthquake laws are
good enough if they are followed’. When asked why the law is not being enforced, he
said ‘The municipal bodies are not equipped to do it. They don’t have enough people’.
Staff shortages in the government departments were consistently explained in terms of
the recruitment policies from the Department of Urban Development (favouring the tem-
porary appointment of ‘retired’ government officials). Competition with the private sector
was not cited as a cause of staffing shortages in government. While empanelled engineers
undoubtedly have the potential to earn much more than government employees with
equivalent qualifications, government jobs were still deemed to be more attractive as
they are secure, permanent and come with pensions. However, it was evident that govern-
ment engineers also concurrently work in the private sector. As government employees
cannot be empanelled engineers, the legal system of using empanelled engineers to
supervise projects and approve plans does not amplify this practice.
In terms of expertise, more than one government engineer noted they did not have the
training or expertise necessary to check the structural integrity of buildings. Architects, while
noting they had structural training as part of their course, explained that they would always
prefer to work with a structural engineer to design buildings. Many engineers said they had
taken a module or undergone some seismic training during their engineering course but in
some of the more provincial areas, heavy reliance was placed on retired engineers who
admitted during interviews, having little knowledge of earthquake-resistant construction
techniques. Engineering qualifications varied considerably, as may be expected, from
highly reputable Indian Institutes (e.g. IIT) to more local colleges teaching B.Tech courses.
The latter tended to be less well informed in terms of seismic safety in building design.
Approximately 25–30% of the engineers interviewed had attended one or more BSDMA
training course but one government engineer who had undertaken the BSDMA training
could only name ‘bands’ as a feature of earthquake-resistant design and another suggested
that out of say 10 earthquake safe design features that they had learned on the course ‘two
may be completely followed, eight I’m not sure about’.
4.3. Accountability
Corruption is a difficult topic to research as people obviously would not admit to their own
corrupt practices. However, some interviewees pointed to the corrupt practices of others.
Corrupt practices vary considerably in terms of their potential impact on safe construction.
Much corruption may be harmless (e.g. a clerk recommending an empanelled engineer
10 S. JONES AND V. VASVANI
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over others for a small fee, or builders paying to have their plans prioritised). Another form
of corruption cited included bribes to approve plans (one government engineer suggested
that up to 20% of applications came with a bribe). Additionally, one government engineer
revealed that 20–30% of applications had ‘some political influence behind them’ (either
the applicant would be accompanied by an influential person or a phone call would be
received). It is likely that byelaws are breached more in terms of plot-to-building ratio
and setback requirements rather than structural integrity but this is not possible to
know for sure. Another practice of concern was the private purchase of certificates from
empanelled engineers for 3000–5000 rupees (roughly 30–50 pounds). Homeowners
take this risk upon themselves but with the enormous growth of large apartment
blocks, particularly around Patna, perhaps the greatest risk of fraudulent certification is
faced by apartment buyers/renters.
Bihar is no exception in terms of the strong connection between the building industry
and politicians. Interviewees revealed that local politicians invest in construction projects.
Construction companies and large builders also help fund election campaigns. The Bihar
Times (2014) reports that the ‘builder-politician-bureaucrat nexus is largely responsible
for the mushroom growth of high rise buildings’. Nitish Kumar is reported to have
received considerable opposition to the 2014 Building Byelaw (as a result of the new
requirements, for example, that 25% of space should be allocated to parking and the
width of road determining the extent of setback). To his credit he went ahead despite
this opposition. However, malpractice is endemic and institutionalised and is difficult
to overturn with new regulations. One interviewee cited the case of the previous
Patna Municipal Commissioner who made a demolition order for three illegal buildings.
He explained that the demolition did not occur (although Jha, 2014 suggests that the
buildings were demolished) and that the Commissioner was suspended for his tough
stance following pressure from the ruling party (this is corroborated in the literature –
Nezami, 2015; Tewary, 2015; Verma, 2015). This suggests that the system is extremely
resistant to improving practices and supports Williams and Mawdseley’s (2006) point
that in India honest government officers face a huge struggle trying to combat
corruption.
4.4. Demand
Mostly the public were very aware of the earthquake risk. Some of the homebuilders
interviewed commented that they were using their hard-earned income to build
their house, why would they compromise on quality and risk the destruction of their
house in an earthquake? Most had sought out reputable engineers and most potential
buyers of apartments were reported to ask to see permissions and certifications. At the
same time, it was frequently suggested by key informants that the public knew little
about earthquake-resistant design and their awareness of earthquake risk was not
matched by their understanding of earthquake-resistant construction. One empanelled
architect, when asked about the public’s understanding of structural design for earth-
quake safety, noted that
I think the basic thing that has to be done is to make the public informative about this. Public
is very ignorant on this part. Like still after the Nepal earthquake they don’t understand actu-
ally. The situation is better than it was before but not as good as it should be.
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In the poorer areas visited (Munger and Naubatpur) a few respondents suggested that
cost was a constraint to safer construction: ‘poor people can’t afford safe houses’ and ‘a
safe house is not a priority when you don’t have enough food to eat’. However, the
poorest of the poor in Bihar tend to live in bamboo houses or makeshift tents. In the
towns and cities, those people building their own homes (or are having their own
homes built) ‘will act according to their budget’ and ‘make their houses as safe as they
can afford’ (e.g. whether they follow engineers’ plans, how frequently they use an engineer
to supervise a site, whether they employ a structural engineer or not). Some of the empa-
nelled engineers suggested that they had to persuade some homebuilders to engage in
earthquake safe construction despite the additional cost. We say to clients ‘if you pay
5–10% more you will be safe throughout your life’.
4.5. Additional factors constraining building byelaw implementation and
earthquake-resistant construction in Bihar
4.5.1. Confusion about expertise
A number of empanelled members mentioned that the public do not have a very good
understanding of who they should consult for structural advice. For example, one empa-
nelled architect noted that ‘Here there is a concept that every person doing the construc-
tion is an engineer.’ People tended not to appreciate that architects are not trained in
structural engineering. The empanelled architect was most concerned about masons.
He commented that ‘even the masons – when they have experience they think they
know more than engineers’. An important point here is that not all of the empanelled
persons who are officially authorised to validate the structural safety of buildings are struc-
tural engineers. In Munger, for example, out of the list of 15 empanelled people, 14 were
architects and only 1 was an engineer, suggesting that most builders are likely to have
their plans signed by someone who is not an expert is structural safety (see Table 1).
4.5.2. Scrutiny of the structural features of building plans
There is no system of regulatory oversight – in particular for checking the plans for structural
integrity. Plans are primarily checked by government staff to ensure that they comply with
other aspects of the building byelaws, such as setbacks, the building-to-plot ratio, and so on.
One empanelled engineer confirmed: ‘The authorities can just check according to the
byelaws – size, setbacks and all that – technicality they can’t check.’ As noted above,
there is insufficient information on the plans for them to be checked for structural integrity
or earthquake safety features and the government authorities legally are not responsible for
this. One empanelled architect suggested that ‘what is submitted on the designs is faulty but
there is no system to check it. But what is made on site is far more inferior than that’.
4.5.3. Areas outside the municipal limits
While areas outside of the municipal limits are still required to adhere to the building
byelaws, permission to build is not required and yet some of these areas are rapidly urba-
nising and are indistinct from the areas required to follow the byelaws. One of the empa-
nelled engineers interviewed expressed concern: ‘Outside the municipal limits
government has not provided any clear cut mandate … . rural areas, if you go there,
new buildings are coming up but they are not following the building bye-laws. There is
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no authority or agency there.’ Areas around rapidly growingmunicipalities need some pro-
vision for submitting and checking plans. Perhaps extending the limits of the municipali-
ties would be one way to address this.
4.5.4. Unauthorised construction
Unauthorised construction could be considered the single biggest problem in Bihar in terms
of building byelaw enforcement. For example, the level of unauthorised construction was
estimated to be around 70–75% in Danapur,7 in Muzzaffarpur it was felt that more than
half of the construction taking place in the municipality was unapproved and in Naubatpur
the local authorities estimated that at least 90% of construction in the area was
unauthorised. Very little action was taken against unauthorised construction. One govern-
ment engineer, for example, noted: ‘Here if we get information about unauthorised con-
struction, we give them notices, so he may submit an application for approval, and then,
even we have not done anythingmuch.’Without specifically getting a complaint, illegal con-
struction is ignored and few of the municipal councils had received complaints. Where
notices were issued it was explained that a common process was to appeal – first to the
local court, then to high court and finally to the supreme court in a process that may
take many years, or be pending for many years. Eventually, the courts tended to give
approval for the buildings and very few demolition orders were made. This was another
arena in which corruption is likely to be playing out. One empanelled architect noted that
‘Even if they are issued a notice, the guy who is making a house goes to a higher authority.
He bribes them, or he does anything to get the notice cancelled.’
One government engineer astutely noted that the system is failing completely in India at
large as no-onewent to prison after Bhuj. Although the byelaw allocates responsibility clearly,
there is ‘nopunishment system’. Another interviewee explained that this is ‘a popular govern-
ment’ (meaning that the government did not want to become unpopular by enforcing
unpopular rules). While Nitish Kumar was willing to pass legislation that was opposed by
the building lobby, little change in practice occurs without it being fully enforced.
Apart for building construction taking place without permission, another unauthorised
and potentially dangerous practice is the construction of additional storeys to a building. It
was explained by an empanelled engineer that when a landowner dies the children would
be eligible to have an equal share of the plot, but adhering setback requirements would
often mean that the subdivided plots would be too small to build on, so additional storeys
are added to a building. In terms of structural safety, the addition of storeys is problematic
in terms of the foundation depth. This practice is most prevalent in the older core areas of
the cities where land is scarce. One interviewee joked that ‘you would have to demolish
half of Bihar’ if this issue of additional storeys were to be addressed.
5. Discussion and conclusion: building code enforcement, urban
governance and the neoliberal agenda
It is virtually impossible to assess the extent of earthquake-resistant construction in Bihar.8
This research has aimed to interrogate the process of building code enforcement and
identify factors inhibiting earthquake-resistant construction practice. This section refers
back to the discussion on regulation and neoliberalism to contextualise the findings
and reflect upon the changing processes for governing building safety.
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The period prior to 2009, when municipal commissioners were solely responsible for
approving building applications, marked a period of state-led regulation in urban govern-
ance. Between 2009 and2014 the pendulum swung in the opposite direction towards pri-
vatisation and market-led practice whereby empanelled architects alone validated plans
and there were no requirements to supervise projects. This was a period of deregulation
and a reduced role for the state in building regulation (equating with Peck and Tickell’s
roll-back neoliberalism). Homeowners chose their engineer/architect/builder in a free
market environment as well as choosing how frequently an engineer checked building
works (most likely determined by their budget). It was suggested by one interviewee
that this system had been much more vulnerable to corruption (there had been ‘malprac-
tice among architects’) and builders were known to be buying structural safety certificates.
As noted above, although this practice was suspected to continue today, it was generally
agreed during key informant interviews that the current legislation, bringing the municipal
bodies back into the picture was considerably better as there are ‘more layers for check-
ing’. This reflects a period of re-regulation or roll-out neoliberalism as the state ‘governs at
a distance’. Legally, municipal bodies are absolved of any duties with respect to structural
safety – which is passed on to empanelled engineers/architects and home owners, but the
government retains the authority to check other aspects of building regulations, such as
building/plot ratios, clearances and permissions, facilities, etc., and the state regulates the
price that can be charged by empanelled persons for their time (as such ‘establishing the
rules for market-led management’).
Some interviewees felt that the state should play a stronger role, in terms of site checks
and construction monitoring but mostly in terms of dealing with unauthorised construc-
tion. On the other hand, it was noted by some of the larger builders that the authorities do
not have the access to the same level of equipment or technology to check the strength of
the materials as the large construction companies, so they could not be so rigorous in
quality control. It was also noted that giving government officials a stronger role in
each stage of the construction process would merely present more opportunities for
taking bribes.
This case study provides an example of a sub-state level form of ‘hybrid neoliberalism’
that has ensued as a result of ‘trial-and-error’ as neoliberal sensibilities are being superim-
posed onto existing forms of governance. In Bihar, the inherited regulatory landscape is
characterised by weak governance and corruption from the pre-Nitish Kumar period
which is highly resilient to improvement, not least because of its ‘builders-politician-
bureaucrat nexus’. Within India at large there is a poor record of the bureaucracy being
punished for corruption and incompetency, as noted by Williams and Mawdseley (2006).
Spence (2004) describes a privatised/market-oriented system that was proposed for
Turkey following the 1999 earthquake whereby private supervision firms take full respon-
sibility for building safety, and where the private sector being covered by indemnity insur-
ance for poor practice. Insurance does not exist in Bihar (Jain, 2015 suggests that current
levels of insurance in India are about 1%). The absence of a penal system (noted by Krim-
gold, 2011 as an essential aspect of a regulatory process for safe construction) essentially
provides an ‘alternative form of insurance’ for empanelled persons (that they will not be
penalised for poor practice) but this does not provide the appropriate incentives for earth-
quake-resistant construction. A market-led system also requires a fully informed consumer
base creating the demand for earthquake safety which equally is weak in Bihar (while this
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research has shown that earthquake risk awareness is reasonably high, civil society’s tech-
nical knowledge of good construction practice is weak). Furthermore, a more advanced
market economy may create greater responsibility for banks/lenders in terms of mortgage
requirements, but in Bihar only a partial process exists (plan approval) without any follow-
up (completion certificates).
In Bihar, the system now renders homeowners and empanelled persons legally respon-
sible for construction practice. This creates an ‘individualization of responsibility that
places more blame on civil-society actors in the case of failure’ (Sletto & Nygren, 2016,
citing Lemke, 2001, p. 202) rather than necessarily creating a safer system. Plans could
include their specific earthquake-resistant features so they can be reviewed by an inde-
pendent/government structural engineer (including structural safety calculations), in
what van der Heijden terms ‘regulatory oversight’.
As the following quotation illustrates, the system that prevails in Bihar currently fails to
provide adequate conditions for citizen safety and may be creating ‘normalised irrespon-
sibility’ as homebuilders have their plans signed by people they think are experts and
apartment buyers think their properties have been supervised by suitably qualified people:
There are many builders building apartments. They don’t have skilled engineers to supervise.
Authorities need to check that they are there or not. Who will say? The plans get approved by
us but then they are doing as per their will, because if they hire us they will have to pay us.
They will cut the steel; they will cut the cement. If M25 is required they will go for M20.
Who is going to check? They don’t go for cube [materials] testing. It should be mandatory.
(empanelled engineer)
This paper has evaluated the factors which have been identified as challenges to the
implementation of building codes and earthquake-resistant construction in the context
of Bihar. There are three key areas of failure in the system: those areas that lie outside
of the regulatory process (rural areas and rapidly urban areas outside municipal limits);
illegal/unauthorised construction which is not being addressed by the state; and failings
in the regulatory system itself (whereby there is no ‘regulatory oversight’). As roll-back
and roll-out neoliberalism have collided with an inherited regulatory context of weak
(poor) governance and a builder-bureaucrat-politician nexus, it has produced a localised
form with neither the strengths of a state-regulated system nor a market-based system.
This form of hybrid neoliberalism is producing normalised risks and irresponsibilities
through the creation of an illusion of safety. The paper has contributed to the literature
by scrutinising the impact of changes in urban governance on the process of building
regulation enforcement in a developing world context. It has shown the failings of the
hybrid neoliberalism for building code enforcement.
Notes
1. Although the distinction between these phases and forms of neoliberalism is made in the
context of the north Atlantic zone, they are evident in other parts of the world as neoliberal
global capitalist governance gained hegemony over the third world (Sangameswaran, 2009;
Sheppard & Leitner, 2010).
2. Claims made to the BSDMA for building damage as a result of the Nepal earthquake in the
District visited were: Patna 20; Munger 11; Muzzafarpur 22 and Darbhanga 109.
3. A registered engineer/architect is a member of a professional body, whereas an empanelled
person is licenced under the ‘Authority’ (municipal body)
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4. There was not a noticeable difference between the views in the different sectors (except
perhaps the large builders who painted quite a glossy picture). Interviewees varied in the
extent to which they were vocal and critical about the current system but government officials
and empanelled persons did not present obviously different perspectives.
5. This was conducted in June 2014 in two districts in seismic zone 5 (Madhubani and Sapaul)
and in January 2013 with key stakeholders based in Patna (particularly the Department of
Urban Development, the Bihar State Disaster Management Authority and the Patna Municipal
Corporation).
6. Some government engineers noted that the only reason building applications were made was
for mortgage purposes. The banks did not require any further paperwork and so there was
little reason to apply for a completion certificate.
7. This was considered to be a substantial underestimate by the second author of the paper who
is familiar with the area and felt that more than 1000 buildings were currently under construc-
tion (suggesting 90% unauthorised construction is taking place).
8. In terms of current practices, one large builder in Patna guessed that about 80% of builders
were following the National Building Code of India in terms of earthquake-resistant practices.
Another large builder in Patna gave a similar estimate: that about 10% of buildings could be
structurally unsafe in an earthquake, but the smaller private houses which are mostly designed
by masons the figure could be more like 70%. Similar estimates were given elsewhere: ‘5–10%
of buildings in Muzaffarpur are not being built earthquake safe. Some older buildings need
retrofittings. 80% of buildings here are safe’ (empanelled engineer). At the other end of the
extreme, one of the government engineers gave a much lower estimate than this: ‘I don’t
think more than 20% of the builders are making earthquake-resistant buildings. I cannot
say for sure’.
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